English and the transnational Ismaili Muslim community:
Identity, the Aga Khan, and infrastructure

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ABSTRACT

The adoption of English as the official language of the transnational Ismaili Muslim community has its roots in the British Raj, which provides the backdrop for recent Ismaili history. Yet it is the Aga Khan IV, spiritual leader of the community since 1957, who has most avidly pushed English as part of a ‘language policy’. Drawing on Ismaili discourse published online, historical sources, secondary literature, and data collected during ethnographic fieldwork in Northern Pakistan and Eastern Tajikistan, this article addresses how English emerged as the community’s official language, how and why it was made integral to the community’s transnational infrastructure, and what English means to Ismailis living in a village in Hunza, Northern Pakistan and the city of Khorog, Eastern Tajikistan. It thereby underscores that identity and infrastructure emerge as entangled, and it reflects upon the implications of this relationship for research on
English and Islam, and language and transnationalism. (Transnationalism, English, Ismaili, Pakistan, Tajikistan, identity, infrastructure, Islam)*

INTRODUCTION

As argued by De Fina & Perrino (2013:514) in a recent special issue on transnational identities, ‘an investigation of transnationalism forces critical reflection on the relationship between language and identity’. Notably, it prompts for consideration of the performance and construction of identity across space and time as intertwined with processes of globalisation. This includes reflection on the relationship between community and physical place, as well as methodological contemplation of ‘where’ to research transnationalism. These issues of approach and methodology merge with questions of epistemology, since different conceptualisations of transnationalism both stem from and simultaneously become grounds for thinking about how and where to research transnationalism. Vertovec (1999) underscores that the meanings of the concept range from more prototypical understandings of transnationalism as diaspora and as connected to migration (cf. also Dahinden 2009), to transnationalism as ‘consciousness’ and ‘capital’. These meanings become differentially pertinent for thinking about the ways language (both discourse and particular varieties, use and ideologies) becomes connected with the shaping, maintenance, and negotiation of transnational ties between individuals, and with how these ties are made to variously interact with local and nation-state related identity categories (cf. also Heller 2010).

As outlined by Steinberg (2011:1) in the introduction to his book on the transnational Ismaili Muslim community, ‘the complex of Ismai’ili forms, processes and structures seems to represent a new possibility for transnational social organization, for sociopolitical participation
beyond the nation-state, for citizenship without territory’. The transnational Ismaili community lives in over twenty-five countries around the world and is said to number anywhere from between 2.5 to twelve million individuals (Steinberg 2011). Since 1957 it has been led by the Aga Khan IV. Conceived of as an ‘intermediary between the divine and human realms’, the Aga Khan is the sole individual who can, via his *ta’wil* or ‘interpretation’, ‘reveal the true, inner meaning, *the batin*, of religion’, while ‘simultaneously [being] a social [and] political … leader to Isma’ilis’ (Steinberg 2011:10). By virtue of the community’s spread and diversity, strategies are needed to draw ‘disparate and scattered communities into the Isma’ili complex, [to] bring… them into the fold of the imamate’ (Steinberg 2011:15). To create, in other words, unity and a shared identity. This is largely achieved via the Aga Khan IV, who makes widespread use of nation-state symbols and structures, including a constitution and a flag, a cohesive ‘development bureaucracy’ (Devji 2009:xii), a ‘highly centralized’ ‘institutional infrastructure’ (Steinberg 2011:1), and an official language—English.

This article focuses on how English became central to the transnational Ismaili complex, on how and why English was made integral to the community’s transnational infrastructure, and on what English means to Ismailis living in a village in Hunza, Northern Pakistan and the city of Khorog, Eastern Tajikistan. In doing so, it aims to contribute to the recent and on-going discussion within the sociolinguistics of globalisation on identity and transnationalism (cf. e.g. De Fina & Perrino 2013), on language and transnational space (cf. e.g. Heller 2010; Jacquemet 2010; Bolander forthcoming a), on the relationship between infrastructure, identity, language and globalisation (cf. e.g. Blommaert 2013, 2014), and on ties between English and Islam (cf. e.g. the papers in Karmani 2005).

Taking first a historical perspective, I argue that the promotion of English by the Aga Khan III and particularly the Aga Khan IV needs to be seen as part of a multifarious process,
linked with the British Raj, the Aga Khan III and IV’s personal linguistic biographies and repertoires, the progressive emergence and anchoring of a transnational web of Aga Khan and Ismaili infrastructure, and accompanying ideologies of English as key to this infrastructure.¹

Drawing on data collected during ethnographic fieldwork, I then maintain that while compatible ideologies of English as the language of possibility and access circulate amongst local Ismailis, these are intricately connected with the figure of the Aga Khan. The Aga Khan emerges, in other words, as fundamental to ties between English and Ismaili identity, both as the community’s spiritual leader and authority, and as the head of the Aga Khan Education Services (AKES), which provides high quality schooling in English and facilitates intranational and international mobility. In this sense, identity and infrastructure emerge as entangled (cf. also Blommaert 2013, 2014; Mostowlansky 2016, forthcoming).

To explore this entanglement, I adopt a practice approach to Ismaili identity as performed and emergent (Bucholtz & Hall 2005), and of infrastructure as both ‘built networks that facilitate the flow of goods, people, or ideas’ (Larkin 2013:328) and as ‘concrete semiotic and aesthetic vehicles oriented to addressees’ (Larkin 2013:329), including language (Blommaert 2013, 2014). Drawing on data from official discourse as well as excerpts from qualitative interviews conducted with Ismailis in Hunza and Khorog, I argue that this entanglement of identity and infrastructure evidences the complex relationship between Ismaili identity and English, and by extension between English and Islam. Via this combined focus on identity and infrastructure, I further point to the ways language becomes pertinent to the formation and discursive enactment of the transnational community.

DATA AND METHODOLOGY
This article largely draws on data collected during ethnographic research in two communities of Ismailis living in a village in central Hunza, Northern Pakistan and the town of Khorog, Eastern Tajikistan. The two regions lie at the borderlands between Pakistan and Tajikistan, which are separated by Afghanistan’s narrow Wakhan Corridor. Both have majority Ismaili populations (Kreutzmann 1996; Bliss 2006; Steinberg 2011), although there is religious and ethnic diversity in Hunza and Khorog, and Ismailis are a minority in Pakistan and Tajikistan (both nation-states have majority Sunni populations). Further, both are multilingual regions, where English is not the first language of either the local Ismaili or non-Ismaili population: in the village in central Hunza where I did fieldwork, the majority of the population speaks Burushaski as their first language, followed by Urdu and then English; and in Khorog, the dominant first language is Shughni, followed by Tajik, Russian, and English (cf. also Bolander forthcoming a, b for further discussion of the fieldwork locations). 

In the course of my fieldwork, I lived with local families, took fieldnotes, and was a participant observer. I also conducted qualitative interviews (N = 21) and two group discussions. These were mainly in English. In the interviews, I eschewed asking my interlocutors about possible connections between English and being Ismaili. In accordance with the performative understanding of identity adopted in this article (and in my research more generally), I wanted to avoid reifying English and Islam, and assuming, a priori, a tie between English and Ismaili identity. If, at the end of an interview, my interlocutors had not explicitly addressed such connections themselves, I asked whether they felt there were ties between attitudes towards English and their belonging to the Ismaili community. Yet this happened rarely. In the majority of cases, reflections on the importance of English and motivations for learning English became entangled with the importance of the Aga Khan and his transnational infrastructure, such that this created a common frame for ensuing discussions on the role of English.
In addition to drawing on ethnographic data, I consulted a wide range of internet and historical sources (in the British Library London and National Archives Kew), which, together with secondary literature, provide the grounds for my subsequent arguments on the progressive emergence of English for the transnational Ismaili community. With respect to Ismaili discourse published online, this article mainly uses speeches by the Aga Khan, as well as brochures and information published on the Aga Khan Development Network (AKDN) or AKES sites. I conceptualise these sites as digital spaces, which are ‘situated not in specific territorial sites but in the virtual reality of mediascapes’ (Jacquemet 2010:58), and as valid field sites within a multisited ethnography (Marcus 1995; Boellstorff, Nardi, Pearce, & Taylor 2012).4

THINK IN ENGLISH, SPEAK IN ENGLISH, AND DREAM IN ENGLISH: THE PROGRESSIVE EMERGENCE OF ENGLISH AS OFFICIAL LANGUAGE AND SYMBOL OF UNITY

During fieldwork in Hunza, Northern Pakistan in 2013, a young woman told me about a sign that used to hang in the classroom of her school, which read Think in English, speak in English, and dream in English. While she could not remember the specifics surrounding the sign’s emergence, she told me it stems from a speech given by the Aga Khan IV, a claim backed up by an elderly man who seems to have been present when the Aga Khan IV pronounced this farman (an edict offering guidance; see the discussion on farmans below) when he visited Hunza for the first time in 1960. The edict was then made into a sign, which hung in Aga Khan schools in the region; and, as highlighted in a recent documentary about the Aga Khan and the transnational Ismaili community (An Islamic conscience: The Aga Khan and the Ismailis 2007–2008), still hangs in Aga Khan schools in the broader region. Both the content and the form of this sign stand out, particularly the syntactic pairing of the three imperatives, ordering pupils not to simply learn
English, so they can, for example, speak it, but also to think and dream in English, to embrace English to such an extent that it becomes a deeply personal language, associated with thoughts and dreams and not just a tool that can be used.

The reasons for the contemporary importance placed on English by the Aga Khan IV are complex and numerous, and, importantly, the result of a lengthy process going back to the British Raj (1858–1947). In this section, I propose and discuss four interconnected reasons to explain why English became central to Ismaili ideology and practice. These include the emergence of a distinct, Ismaili community against the backdrop of the British Raj; the Aga Khan III and Aga Khan IV’s competence in and progressive use of English in official discourse and farmans; the rise of a web of transnational infrastructure concurrent with the geographical expansion of the community; and ideologies of English as the global language of progress.

The British Raj as the context for the emergence of a distinct, Ismaili community

The British Raj provided the social and linguistic backdrop for recent Ismaili history (Daftary 2007; Devji 2009; van Grondelle 2009). Historically, the Ismaili population was spread over parts of South and Central Asia as well as in the Middle East (Devji 2009:x). In 1840, the Aga Khan I (1804–1881) fled Persia for Sind in India (Clarke 1976:484). Aiding the British in the First Afghan War, he was rewarded financially and politically by being given the rank of ‘hereditary prince’ (Clarke 1976:484). By 1848, he had permanently settled in Bombay, an act denoting the beginning of the ‘modern period in the history of the ... Ismailis’ (Daftary 2007:473). During his time in Bombay, and as a result of religious dues paid to him at his Bombay home, the Aga Khan I managed to establish headquarters and residences in Bombay, Poona, and Bangalore (Daftary 2007:473). Visited by the Prince of Wales (the future King Edward VII) during his trip to India,
he also began to be addressed as His Highness by the British (Daftary 2007:474). The protection received from the British establishment both ‘strengthened his position and helped him in the exercise of his authority’ (Daftary 2007:474).

Yet the community was ‘disorganized’, ‘unsettled’, and rife with disputes concerning its identity and rightful leadership (Clarke 1976:485). This culminated in 1866, in the ‘Aga Khan Case’ (Daftary 2007; Purohit 2012), which was presided over by an English justice, Sir Justice Arnould. In his reflections on the Aga Khan I’s suit against recalcitrant Ismailis in Bombay, Sir Justice Arnould raises questions about the identity of the Ismailis (e.g. ‘Who and what are the Shia IMAMEE ISMAILIS?’; British Library record P/T 5580, emphasis in original); and in providing answers forged on the basis of case evidence, he also constructs and codifies their identity. As stated by Clarke (1976:485), together with a later judgment pronounced in Tanganyika in 1924, this case ‘must be considered to have played a very important role in shaping and structuring Modern Ismailism’. In addition to establishing the legal status of the Ismailis and declaring the Aga Khan I their only legitimate leader (Daftary 2007:476), the judgement bolstered the relationship between the Aga Khan and the British Empire (Steinberg 2011:44). Indeed, the Ismailis ‘came to see themselves as Isma‘ili through the lens of the British construction of legal community’ (Steinberg 2011:39).

The cooperation between the Ismaili elite and the colonial power was intensified during the reign of the Aga Khan III (1885–1957), who was educated at Eton and Cambridge and made a member of the Imperial Legislative Council in 1902, and thus part of the British imperial administration (van Grondelle 2009:25). It is also evidenced in van Grondelle’s (2009) study of previously unanalysed records of private papers and correspondence between the Aga Khan III and members of the British colonial administration, in which he shows how both parties profited from the relationship. Whereas the Aga Khan III received support and legitimacy from the British
colonial administration, the colonial administration benefited from the strategic location and loyalty to the crown of the Aga Khan III’s followers in Afghan Badakhshan, Chinese Turkestan, the Northern Areas (of today’s Pakistan), and British East Africa (van Grondelle 2009).

These bonds continued with the 1957 succession of the Aga Khan IV, who was ‘firmly established as a friend of Britain’ (van Grondelle 2009:87). This is evidenced, for example, by his ties to British royalty and the British government, and by the choice of London as the home for the Institute of Ismaili Studies (IIS), a research institute devoted to the study of Muslim cultures and societies (Institute of Ismaili Studies; see discussion below).

In addition to the close relationship between the Aga Khans and the British Empire/British elite, and the role played by the British Empire in distinguishing and fortifying a distinctly Ismaili identity, there is a third reason why the British Empire proved important to the emergence of English. This is related, however, not to actions on the part of the Empire, but rather to a key tenet of Ismaili ideology: that Ismailis be loyal to the place where they live. Since many Ismailis lived in the British Empire, this translated into a call for them to know English, as shown in example (1), from the Aga Khan III’s memoirs, written in English, which refers to Ismailis in British East Africa.

(1) So far as their way of life is concerned, I have tried to vary the advice which I have given to my followers in accordance with the country or state in which they live. Thus in the British colony of East Africa I strongly urge them to make English their first language, to found their family and domestic lives along English lines and in general to adopt British and European customs—except in the matter of alcohol and slavery to tobacco. (Aga Khan 1954:37)
This might also partially explain why a farman broadcast in Persian\textsuperscript{8} from Delhi to Hunza in 1940 calls for Ismailis to ‘[t]ry to educate your children and strive to learn European languages and the English language’ (Hunzai 2004:12).

*The Aga Khan III and Aga Khan IV’s proficiency in and progressive use of English*

The emergence of a modern, distinctly Ismaili community in direct interaction with the British Raj is related to the second reason why English became important: the fact that both the Aga Khan III and the Aga Khan IV became proficient in English from a young age. In *The memoirs of Aga Khan: World enough and time*, the Aga Khan III claims he was ‘taught English, French, Arabic and Persian’ (Aga Khan 1954:7), qualifying that he received three and a half hours of English and French lessons per day, and three hours of Arabic (Aga Khan 1954:40); and adding that he perused the family library for books in all four languages—English, French, Persian, and Arabic (Aga Khan 1954:43). His memoirs also comment on language proficiency, with the Aga Khan III claiming that ‘by the time I was thirteen I could read and write English, tolerable French, perfect Persian and fair Arabic’ (Aga Khan 1954:45). This indicates a hierarchy such that he claims to have felt most confident (writing) in English and Persian, followed by French and Arabic, an assertion evidenced by his tendency to use English (and to a lesser extent Persian) in writings, speeches, and farmans.

The Aga Khan IV, by contrast, seems to have been raised in mostly French and then later English, perhaps because he was born in Geneva, Switzerland, to a British mother. (His father, Prince Aly Khan, was the son of the Aga Khan III.) There is no conclusive evidence of his linguistic repertoire. Yet according to a UK press interview conducted in 1958, he can speak English and French ‘relatively fluently’, as well as ‘a smattering of Urdu, a smattering of Spanish
and a little bit of Italian; and an entry about him on an Ismaili online site maintains that he was taught Arabic, Urdu, and Islamic history by a private tutor at home, alongside his schooling. A look at available speeches, interviews, and writings shows a clear preference for English with the Aga Khan predominantly using English, except when giving speeches or interviews in countries or regions where French is an official or widely used language; in these cases he uses French. Overall, however, English is prioritised, in the sense that whereas French speeches and interviews are translated into English, English ones tend not to be translated.

The same can be said for farmans, which are increasingly in English, although they are also translated into languages prominent in local Ismaili communities, for example, Arabic, Persian, Tajik, Urdu, Gujarati, Sindhi, and French (Asani 2011:120) by members of Tariqah and Religious Education Boards. Farmans are deemed to ‘embod[y] the ongoing and infallible guidance of the Imams’, and to thus be ‘obligatory’ for members of the community (Asani 2011:111). Moreover, while farmans are experienced as oral texts that are read aloud in Jamatkhanas (community centres), they also circulate in written form and can reach beyond one particular local community. As Asani (2011:120) states: ‘[a]s farmans have become readily accessible through the medium of print, they have become the primary source of religious guidance shared universally by Ismailis’. Moreover, ‘[a] farman which the Aga Khan makes in Dushanbe, Tajikistan, may be read in a jama‘atkhana in Karachi, Mombasa, Toronto or Boston’ (Asani 2011:120). Clearly this process of distribution is facilitated if the farmans are issued in a common language, and then translated according to need by (local) members of the Tariqah and Religious Education Boards. By printing and circulating texts, they are made persistent and can more readily be distributed not only in space but also across time. Yet while this choice may be practicable, the fact that English is used gives it value in the eyes of the transnational community, particularly since the Aga Khan is the community’s spiritual leader and sole authority. Since
farmans are often seen as containing ‘religious’ guidance (Asani 2011:120), this exemplifies, too, the complex relationship between Ismaili identity and English.

The emergence and anchoring of transnational infrastructure

As outlined by Steinberg (2011:49), the Aga Khan III set into motion the emergence of ‘a new system of translocal organization, and the beginnings of what might legitimately be called a global context’, consisting of ‘elaborately structured national councils and constitutions, the worldwide distribution of farman edicts, and a post-colonial system of global communication’. This infrastructure was complemented by a series of ‘community-building’ measures (Steinberg 2011:49), including projects in the field of health (e.g. hospitals, pharmacies), education (e.g. schools, libraries), sport and leisure (e.g. clubs, libraries), and housing (Steinberg 2011:50); as well as visits undertaken by the Aga Khan III for jubilee celebrations, which were key ‘for the formation of a sense of connection between subjects from different areas’ (Steinberg 2011:49).¹²

When the Aga Khan IV became Imam in 1957, he expanded these ventures initiated by his grandfather, shaping the ‘community-based transnational infrastructure into one of the world’s largest nongovernmental organizations’ (Karim 2011:214), the Aga Khan Development Network (AKDN). According to its website, the AKDN is active in thirty countries, employing ca. 80,000 individuals, ‘the majority of whom are based in developing countries’, and with an annual budget for ‘non-profit development activities’ of ca. US $600 million.¹³ The AKDN is subservient to the Imamate, and thus currently to the Aga Khan IV, and it has mandates in diverse fields, including health, architecture, and education. Of particular relevance in this article is the rubric of ‘social development’, which includes the Aga Khan University, the University of Central Asia, and the Aga Khan Education Services. These institutions strongly rely on English
in official publications, and promote English as a major (in select cases only) medium of instruction. The schools and universities position themselves as nondenominational (i.e. open to all pupils irrespective of their religious background), and during fieldwork in Hunza, for example, I was told about a small minority of non-Ismailis who used to attend school with some of my interlocutors. At the same time, since both central Hunza and Khorog have majority Ismaili populations, in both places English instruction in these institutions is thus predominantly made available to Ismailis.

Since 1991 these institutions have also been active in the Soviet Union. Indeed the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 facilitated the institutional embedding of Central Asian Ismailis who had been cut off from the wider community for much of the Soviet Union and particularly since the 1930s. With respect to the spread of English, this, too, had important consequences. English became a language of instruction in Aga Khan Schools in Kyrgyzstan (alongside Russian) and Tajikistan (alongside Tajik and Russian); and it was selected as the medium of instruction for the University of Central Asia\textsuperscript{14} (cf. also Bolander forthcoming b).

In addition to launching the AKDN, the Aga Khan IV enforced and solidified both his authority and the community’s transnationalism via a global constitution launched in 1986. This constitution ‘was to be in effect for all Ismaili communities world-wide, superseding numerous local or regional ones’ (Asani 2011:121). One of its prime objectives appears to have been the specification of the organisational structure of the community, an earlier version of which was recorded by Sir Justice Arnoald during the Aga Khan Case (as mentioned above; cf. also Clarke 1978), and modified under the Aga Khan III. In addition to further cementing the status of the Aga Khan IV as the community’s sole authority, the constitution outlines the role of national, regional, and local councils, which are responsible for the ‘social governance of the Jamat [community]’ (Ismailia Constitution 1986\textsuperscript{15}:article 5), and Tariqah and Religious Education
Boards, which are responsible for ‘the training of religion teachers and waezeen [trained preachers], for research and publication, and for the performance of such functions in relation to the Ismaili Tariqah as Mawlana Hazar Imam may deem necessary’ (Ismailia Constitution 1986:article 8).

The constitution also contains a language article—article 20 ‘Governing Language and Publication’—which names English as its sole authoritative language (example (2)).

(2) 20.1 This Constitution is published in English, which shall alone be recognized and accepted as its authoritative language.

20.2 Publication of this Constitution in any other language shall be treated as a translation only.

For Leonard (2009:183) the introduction of a global constitution constitutes an act of ‘replacing regionalism with a vision of a pan-Ismaili global community’ (cf. also Asani 2011). In light of the emphasis on English, this act clearly infuses English with value and gives it official status on a transnational scale. English becomes integral, in other words, to the Aga Khan’s ‘vision of a pan-Ismaili global community’.

Ideologies of English as a global language of progress

While one might argue that reasons (i), the importance of English for the community can be traced back to the British Raj, and (ii), the Aga Khan III and Aga Khan IV knew/know and widely used/use English, paved the way for English to become key to the emergence and anchoring of a particular form of Ismaili transnationalism (reason (iii)), it is important to underscore that its adoption was and continues to be fuelled by ideologies of English as a global
language associated with progress. This is evidenced in various speeches and interviews given by the Aga Khan IV, as well as in brochures disseminated by AKDN and AKES institutions. Thus, example (3), the official translation of an extract taken from an interview given in French to the Lebanese Broadcasting Corporation in 2011, shows the Aga Khan IV employ the term *language policy* in connection with *development potential* to explain the adoption of English.

(3) The vast majority of the community is not in the West, and its first language is not a Western language. We have made English our second language. That yes! Because, in the sixties, in the seventies, we needed to have a language policy. If a community was without a language policy, it would dissociate itself from its development potential. And English is the language that we chose. So today, the Ismaili community speaks Farsi, Arabic, Swahili, English, French, Portuguese, etc. And then, there is a language that is more and more common, it’s their second language, for a large majority it is English.¹⁶

By casting English into the role of the community’s second language, the Aga Khan allows for both heterogeneity (different Ismaili communities know and, as other official discourse makes manifest, should know and continue to learn different languages) as well as unity (English is the language Ismailis share and are all encouraged to learn). He thereby underscores his vision of a global community which is economically productive: a vision which couples English with progress, and by implication with the infrastructure of the AKDN put in place to further the community’s economic success.

Typically mentioned in connection with themes like ‘development’, ‘research’ and ‘education’, speeches and interviews given by the Aga Khan show that English becomes reified as the language of possibility for the developing world. Prominent keywords used to describe English in speeches, interviews, and writings of the Aga Khan IV¹⁷ include *access, opportunities,*
essential, global language, development, a necessity, connecting language, primary language of
global connection, and international language. The notion of connection also features in Aga
Khan Education Services discourse, as shown, for example, in (4), taken from an Aga Khan
Academies brochure (cf. also Bolander forthcoming a for a discussion of this example).

(4) The Academies will provide an education that fosters multilingualism, starting with a
policy of dual-language instruction in the Junior School, with English as the lingua franca
across the network of Academies combined with local language instruction at each
Academy, thus bridging the global with the local.¹⁸

Considered ‘a vehicle of progress and a language which surpasses borders’ (Roch
2005:22, my translation), English serves as the language that binds the academies (and schools)
together and that facilitates inter-institutional and thus intra- and international mobility. As a
global language associated with ‘access’, ‘development’, and ‘opportunity’, the Aga Khan’s
‘English plus policy’ clearly privileges English while recognising the importance of
multilingualism.

LOCAL DISCOURSES ON THE MEANINGS OF ENGLISH

Analysis of qualitative interviews and fieldnotes shows that local discourses on the value of
English largely mirror the transnational policies promoted by the Aga Khan, while underscoring
intricate links between English and Ismaili identity, and between identity and infrastructure. To
explore these local discourses on the meanings of English, I first focus on ties between English,
the Aga Khan and Ismaili identity, before addressing the establishment of schools and other
educational facilities providing English-medium instruction and English language teaching in
Hunza and Khorog. These two subsections pave the way for the ensuing discussion of the entanglement of identity and infrastructure.

*English, the Aga Khan, and Ismaili identity*

The Aga Khan IV is often explicitly mentioned as the transnational source for local individual or community aspirations to learn English (cf. also Bolander forthcoming a, b). This becomes apparent through references my interlocutors make to the Aga Khan’s farmans on the importance of English, and to the Aga Khan’s own use of English in speeches and farmans. Thus in example (5), taken from an interview conducted in English with Karim and Sultan from Hunza, Karim explicitly links attempts to learn English with the farmans of the Aga Khan.

(5) Karim: And specially in these areas people … ah people are trying, people are trying to learn English. Like they want to have a good ah grip on English and that’s because- ah only because the farman of Hazir Imam, Prince Karim Aga Khan, he has a- a strongly- like he strongly wants us to speak English, like on many platforms, on many forums, he has been saying this on his farmans…

Many of my examples similarly suggest that Ismailis are striving to learn English because the Aga Khan has ordered them or asked them to do so; and by virtue of his authority and status as Imam, it is likely that his encouragement has fuelled the learning of English amongst his followers. Yet while examples like (5) link the Aga Khan’s transnational language policy to local practice, in drawing attention to the centrality of the Aga Khan, they also highlight issues of identity. Indeed, in referring to the role played by the Aga Khan for individual and community aspirations to learn English, my interlocutors also position themselves as Ismaili. In such
encounters, they construct their identity as Ismaili not by overtly labelling themselves as Ismaili, but by identifying with the Aga Khan and ratifying his role as their leader.

Such positioning is made explicit in (6), where Gulnoz foregrounds the Aga Khan’s own use of English during his first visit to Khorog in 1995 as the reason for her desire to learn English.

(6) Gulnoz: It was 1995 when the Aga Khan come he-- here and he speech and I really wa- I don’t know what he’s talking about and uh he should come- he say in 1995 he came and he promise to come 98 and in mys-- in my heart I make like a promise that second time when he will be here I will understand whatever he will tell people. … Yeah. This is the- this is um how uh my English open.

For Gulnoz the Aga Khan’s promise to return to Khorog in 1998 becomes the source of her own promise to understand him when he does. The Aga Khan’s use of English, in other words, becomes tied to her ‘imagined identity’ (Norton 2013; Darvin & Norton 2015), to her wish or aspiration to be an individual who can understand her spiritual leader when he visits his community, and who does not need to rely on a translation to do so. This same idea is at the heart of the phrase direct access, used by a young woman from Khorog to explain to me why local people are trying to learn English. English, in other words, is seen to grant these Ismailis direct access to their spiritual leader, the Aga Khan. As a result, these desires and wishes to learn English become linked both with attempts to obey the Aga Khan, and attempts to become closer to him.

While learning English or motivations to learn English are not exclusive to the local Ismaili community, such explicit references to the Aga Khan (as shown in examples (5) and (6)) clearly suggest ties between English and Ismaili identity. This argument is given further weight
via implicit or explicit suggestions that English is compatible with Ismaili doctrine. Indeed, according to Zafar, considered an authority in Hunza, English has ‘almost become a matter of faith for every Ismaili around the world’. Its ready adoption can, as he explained it to me, be associated with the Ismailis’ ‘intellectual faith’, which emphasises ‘process’ not ‘product’. While Zafar is quick to point to the continued importance of local and regional languages (a claim that is compatible with the Aga Khan’s English plus policy outlined above), Ismailis are said to be open to learning English because they are receptive to change (process). This same argument is illustrated in (7), taken from an interview with an elderly man in Hunza (and translated from Burushaski into English by my research assistant). Here Nasir links a preference for English with the status of English as an international language and the importance of adapting to change in the world.

(7) Nasir: but we prefer more um English, because uh our Hazir Imam Prince Aga Khan in his farmans he- he um- he uh- he uh tell us- um he orders us to speak English, because it’s an international language, and we follow him. So that’s why uh we speak uh English, because it’s international language and our Imam ask us [ uh to go with the change in time um um- according to the world, where it goes, how it works, and um be up to date, so that’s why we are following English.

While underscoring the validity of the Aga Khan’s emphasis on English through reference to its status as an “international language”, Nasir also links the importance of English with being “up to date”. In doing so, he makes manifest that the two cannot be severed.

While Zafar and Nasir connect Ismaili identity to English through reference to what is shared by Ismailis, or to ‘sameness’, Salma also does so via reference to ‘difference’, as shown in example (8).
(8) Salma:  I think those n-- you know, other non-Ismailis, they have-- they are with the passage of time, they are realising the importance of English as well, but our community, you know, our community h-- has left other communities far behind in this um- in this race of learning.

Salma’s performance of an individual Ismaili identity is achieved here via juxtaposition of “our community” with “non-Ismailis”. Yet since she uses the plural—“our” and “non-Ismailis”—this performance of difference is simultaneously (Levitt & Glick Schiller 2004) also achieved on a higher scale (Blommaert 2007, 2015), namely that of the community as a whole. Importantly, this affords a mapping of Ismaili identity onto learning more generally, and English more specifically. In other words, as an Ismaili Salma is different from non-Ismailis with respect to recognition of the importance of English, as are all Ismailis (who belong to “our community”, probably local Ismailis in the Hunza region where she lives) compared with non-Ismailis—in this instance (as becomes apparent later in the interview) a local Twelver Shia community (cf. also Harlech-Jones, Sajid, & ur-Rahman 2003; Mostowlansky 2016).

Such examples suggest that the notion of English as a common language is not constrained to official transnational discourse imparted top-down, but also emergent in local discourse, where it becomes connected with issues of Ismaili identity and the figure of the Aga Khan. Yet issues of identity are only one side of the coin; and they cannot be severed from the provision of infrastructure.

*The Imamate and infrastructure: Education and English in Hunza and Khorog*
A look at secondary literature shows that the Aga Khan III and the Aga Khan IV began to heavily invest in Hunza as early as the 1940s, when the Aga Khan III established a ‘Diamond Jubilee Investment Trust’ with funds he had been gifted from his followers for his Diamond Jubilee (i.e. his sixtieth year anniversary as Imam, for which he received his personal weight in diamonds; Benz 2014:128). In Hunza (and neighbouring areas of Ismaili settlement), funds from this trust were used to establish Diamond Jubilee schools, which aimed to ‘bring an end to the restrictive permission system which controlled and limited access to formal education, and to allow school attendance for all children, irrespective of their class and family background’ (Benz 2014:128). By 1960, Diamond Jubilee schools in Gilgit-Baltistan also catered to girls’ education (Benz 2014:129). While instruction was originally provided in Urdu, in 1997 the schools became English-medium schools; and in the same year, the Aga Khan Education Services, Pakistan (AKES, P) also established English-medium secondary schools.

These private Aga Khan Higher Secondary Schools are known for their ‘high quality standards’ (Benz 2013:130), and were frequently mentioned during my fieldwork with respect to the quality of teaching in English. While the most reputable English-medium schools in Gilgit-Baltistan at the secondary level are costly and unaffordable for the majority of local residents, ‘the beginning of the age of mass education in Gilgit-Baltistan’ for boys (Benz 2014:128), and later for girls (Benz 2014:129; cf. also Benz 2013) is the result of efforts on the part of the Aga Khan III who used his authority to make local rulers of Ismaili settlement areas, who were themselves Ismaili, open up the educational system to children from various backgrounds. These efforts have been continued by the Aga Khan IV and the AKDN, who have contributed widely both to a general increase in literacy in largely rural Gilgit-Baltistan as well as to an increase in access to English.
During fieldwork in Hunza, it became apparent that the Aga Khan’s farmans and speeches on the importance of English also need to be seen in connection with this infrastructure. To return to example (5), repeated here as the first part of (9), after mentioning the importance of farmans for Ismailis learning English in the region, Karim goes on to underscore the Aga Khan’s role in creating educational opportunities (marked in italics in example (9)).

(9) Karim: And specially in these areas people … ah people are trying, people are trying to learn English. Like they want to have a good ah grip on English and that’s because- ah only because the farman of Hazir Imam, Prince Karim Aga Khan, he has a- a strongly- like he strongly wants us to speak English, like on many platforms, on many forums, he has been saying this on his farmans, and you can see the schools here. You don-- ah you- you must have seen there is no government school here and there’s not even primary school. Every set up is by ah the Aga Khan AKDN, you can see the Diamond Jubilee schools, and this system in the Hunza again.

Referring here to the school situation in upper Hunza, Karim conjoins the Aga Khan’s farmans on the need to learn English with his setting up of schools in the area, where previously there were none. If we think back to the notion of infrastructure outlined in the introduction, we see here how the Aga Khan’s speeches and farmans on English (infrastructure as ‘concrete semiotic and aesthetic vehicles oriented to addressees’; Larkin 2013:329) are linked with infrastructure in the sense of a ‘built network’ of schools (Larkin 2013:328), through which English can be disseminated, and which also channels the movement of Ismailis (cf. also Bolander forthcoming a).
In Khorog, too, despite widespread differences in the degree of English expansion as a result of language policy and practice during the Soviet Union, an upsurge in English-medium instruction is strongly connected with efforts on the part of the Aga Khan. Overall in Tajikistan, English has the status of a foreign language, although it is hard to find sources on its’ role and spread. It began to be taught as a foreign language in the Soviet Union, and its importance grew strongly in the aftermath of World War II (Pavlenko 2003). Recently, it has become more significant in Tajikistan overall, with the government launching a program in 2003 to improve the teaching and learning of both Russian and English during 2004 to 2014 (Nagzibekova 2008:506). Further, in the school year of 2004-2005, 0.04% of students (N = 1,673,745) did their secondary schooling in English, a factor Nagzibekova (2008:504) describes as ‘a new tendency in Tajik education’. Yet in Khorog, the Aga Khan Lycée is the only school to offer English-medium instruction (along with instruction in Tajik and Russian, with students competing for entry into the different streams), and most local institutions providing English-language training or English-medium instruction are run or facilitated by the Aga Khan Development Network.

Speaking with Bahtibek, an authority connected with the Aga Khan Lycée, I was told that the decision to open the school was already made in 1996, in connection with the establishment in the same year of an Aga Khan Education Services office (example (10)).

(10) Bahtibek: It was in uh 1996. [ From 1996 uh the AKES office had been established here in Khorog. In Tajikistan, in Dushanbe it was [ and they started uh to find out uh possibilities uh to open uh … a school which will be belong to AKES, Aga Khan Education Service, and uh within this two year they mhm started preparing the teachers, uh find out place which will be appropriate to uh demands of uh modern schools, and uh … uh because uh uh if you remember that uh time was uh uh very difficult for uh Tajikistan and the Civil War, and some other
challenges, uh to build a new school was uh really difficult that time. Therefore the government uh decided uh uh to build this school on the basis of the uh old government school. [ Before it was the government school number 3. And uh uh … the decision came to that that uh this building should be renovated, totally renovated and the AKES can um open the school in this building.

Established just five years after the dissolution of the Soviet Union and during the Tajik Civil War (1992–1997), the Aga Khan Lycée took the place of ‘government school number 3’, and was ‘totally renovated’ to fit the demands of ‘modern schools’. Opened in 1998, in 2001 the school began to introduce English-medium instruction, along with Tajik- and Russian-medium instruction, because, as pointed out by Bahtibek in example (11).

(11) Bahtibek: it was a requirement from the … uh … AKES, Aga Khan Education Service, that in order … students of Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Oblast uh will be able to admit to the international universities, especially to the Central Asia University.

Thus the language policy adopted in the Aga Khan Lycée seems to have directly emerged from aims to further the mobility of local students, particularly between Khorog and the University of Central Asia, which was established in 2001, with town campuses planned for Khorog in Tajikistan, for Naryn in Kyrgyzstan and for Tekeli in Kazakhstan. By virtue of its choice to implement English at its medium of instruction, knowledge of English emerges as important to the flow of pupils from the Aga Khan Lycée to the University of Central Asia.
Similarly, the establishment of the Khorog English Program (KEP) in the same year aimed to provide English instruction to local graduate students from Khorog so as to facilitate them entering masters programs at the Institute of Ismaili Studies (IIS) in London. These exchange opportunities also facilitate community building, since Ismailis from all around the world meet at the IIS, as I observed when I spent time with Ismaili students of diverse backgrounds studying at the IIS in London in 2015. Thus, as I argue in Bolander (forthcoming a) with respect to education, while ‘English is not a sufficient condition to be part of the transnational Ismaili community’, ‘Ismaili transnationalism which is institutionally organised and facilitated often does depend on knowing English’.

**ENTANGLEMENTS OF IDENTITY AND INFRASTRUCTURE**

Throughout the article I have illustrated that local orientations towards (learning) English are shaped by the Aga Khan, as spiritual leader, authority, and source of a network of infrastructure facilitating English language learning and international mobility. The centrality of the Aga Khan and the complex relationship between Ismaili identity and English are also illustrated in the final example I wish to focus on, example (12), which offers a continuation of (5) and (9).

(12) Karim: And specially in these areas people … ah people are trying, people are trying to learn English. Like they want to have a good ah grip on English and that’s because- ah only because the farman of Hazir Imam, Prince Karim Aga Khan, he has a- a strongly- like he strongly wants us to speak English, like on many platforms, on many forums, he has been saying this on his farmans, and you can see the schools here. You don-- ah you- you must have seen there is no
government school here and there’s not even primary school. Every set up is by ah the Aga Khan AKDN, you can see the Diamond Jubilee schools, and this system in the Hunza again.

<two additional turns>

Karim: So it’s the influence of Hazir Imam.

Sultan: Influence of religion.

<interruption>

Sultan: I think ah religion ah also has played a role a little. But, partly I- I think ah this new generation they’re- they’re not very religious. It’s just the- the realization that they do need to understand it in order to, you know, succeed in life, for a job, for anything. Communicating with the world [because. I don’t think these- this new generation is very religious. … So, it’s just the need. Ah the- the requirement. Ah the- the prerequisites, everywhere for a job, for anything.

Karim: yes.] Exactly.

Sultan: [So I think

Karim: But- but] but the fundaments were- the fundaments were set by him.

Sultan: Yes. [They were

Karim: The basis.] The realization of th-- telling the people about [the importance of English

Sultan: Parents- parents] stressing their children to ah s-- study English, learn it, so it could be useful.

In this example, Karim and Sultan co-construct a complex argument, which proceeds in interlinked and overlapping stages. First, the Aga Khan and his farmans are depicted as the
original source for local motivations amongst Ismailis to learn English ("that’s because- ah only because the farman of Hazir Imam, Prince Karim Aga Khan"). Then the role played by infrastructure in the form of schools is referred to ("and you can see the schools here… Every set up is by ah the Aga Khan AKDN"). This is followed by an orientation towards religion that is first made synonymous with the Aga Khan and given agency in prompting a move towards English ("So it’s the influence of Hazir Imam. Influence of religion"), and then backgrounded, as a taken-for-granted view that English is necessary emerges as more relevant ("It’s just the- the realization that they do need to understand it"). Finally, the argument is brought full circle as the Aga Khan again becomes cast as the source of this view that English is necessary ("But- but but the fundaments were- the fundaments were set by him").

As indicated through this example, and others in this article, English has multifarious meanings for Ismailis. These meanings shift within and across contexts, as English is linked more or less explicitly to Ismaili identity and to the Aga Khan’s transnational infrastructure. Since these views may occur simultaneously, or separately, and be expressed with respect to local difference and/or transnational sameness, the examples also underscore the methodological challenge of studying the on-going and emergent process whereby identities are constructed and shaped, and the ways this process can be influenced by transnationalism.

**CONCLUSION**

This article highlights that there is widespread compatibility between the Aga Khan’s official discourse and local discourses on English, pointing to the fact that the transnational policy of the Aga Khan has a salient effect on local ideologies of and access to English. This pertains both to the ‘built networks’ of schools, as well as to what one might call a ‘form of political rationality
that underlie[s] technological projects and which give[s] rise to an ‘apparatus of governmentality’ (Foucault 2010, p. 70)’ (Larkin 2013:328). The discussion of English here shows how it has become central to the Aga Khan’s vision for the transnational community, and it reflects upon how this vision is taken up in local communities. In the course of this article, it has become apparent that English is not only a tool facilitating opportunity, for example, via physical movement between institutions, but also, at the same time, bound to identity and processes of community building. Choices to learn English and to accept and embrace English are discursively constructed as part of what it means to be Ismaili, and at times, also explicitly linked to creating borders and difference to other, non-Ismaili, yet Muslim others, a point that has been underscored by Mostowlansky (2016) for ‘development encounters’ in the region more generally. Furthermore, English can become linked to the formation of ties between individuals and the Aga Khan, by virtue of their knowledge that a command of English can provide them with direct access to their spiritual leader. In highlighting these different ways English becomes entangled with identity and infrastructure, the article challenges arguments that English can readily be mapped onto distinct and discrete spheres of Ismail practice (e.g. ‘secular’ or ‘religious’; Kassam-Remtulla 2009), and more generally that English is somehow foreign to or in conflict with Islam (cf. also Mohd-Asraf 2005).

Much research remains to be done on differences within and between local communities, and on the gap between ideologies of English as providing access and the actual provision of access through English. Yet focusing on the interplay between the transnational language policy of the Aga Khan and local discourses on English highlights some of the ways transnational ideas and actions become intertwined with and made a source for local ideologies and practices. Drawing on ethnographic interview data, historical sources, and digital data, the discussion underscores that transnationalism is performed in various sites and through different modes, with
the Aga Khan IV playing a central role to ideologies of English as an important local resource and symbol of identity. Viewed from this perspective, this article suggests a view of transnationalism that takes account of identity and infrastructure, and their entanglement, and that simultaneously conceptualises transnationalism as both process and practice.

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1 I am grateful to Jan Blommaert for pointing out the relevance of the notion of ‘infrastructure’ in connection with the emergence of English for the Ismaili community.

2 Only further research on other Ismaili communities, for example in East Africa, can show the extent to which these results can be seen as more generally applicable. Yet discussions with Ismailis in London hailing from diverse backgrounds and the fact that the distinct settings of Hunza and Khorog highlight comparable results suggest the emergence of salient tendencies.

3 Two of my interviews in Hunza were held in Burushaski and translated for me on site by my research assistant.
There is a wide range of different types of social media used by Ismailis around the world, in addition to official or semi-official webpages and a mailing list, and further research on these media is needed.

British Library Record P/T 5580. Judgment by the Hon’ble Sir Joseph Arnould in the Kojah case, otherwise known as the Aga Khan case, heard in the High Court of Bombay, during April and June, 1866: Judgement delivered, 12th November 1866. African and Asian studies reading room, British Library, London.

The Aga Khan II succeeded his father, Aga Khan I, in 1881, but died three years later (van Grondelle 2009:22).

Institute of Ismaili Studies. Online: http://www.iis.ac.uk/.

The Aga Khan III had a Persian-speaking mother, and, according to his own memoirs knew Persian fluently (Aga Khan 1954). Although Persian remains important for local communities of Ismailis, for example, in Iran, and as one of the languages of ginans ‘devotional hymns, prayers’, it has become progressively less important overall.


While farmans are generally not shared outside of the Ismaili community, rare exceptions I have seen are in English. From conversations with my interlocutors during fieldwork, I also learned that farmans are issued in English and then, depending on the target audience, translated by the Tariqah and Religious Education Boards or other local Ismaili authorities on site.
The community also spread further as a result of migration of Khoja Ismaili communities from East Africa to Europe, North America and Australia in the second half of the twentieth century as a result of decolonisation (Karim 2011; cf. also Mukadam & Mawani 2007; Daftary 2007; Steinberg 2011).


University of Central Asia. Online: www.ucentralasia.org/.


All names are pseudonyms. Unless otherwise stated, all interviews were conducted in English and have thus not been translated by the author.

The transcription of the data is broad, but includes indications of false starts and repetitions (marked using single or double hyphens), overlaps (marked using square brackets) and salient silences (relative to the speakers’ pace of speaking) (marked using ellipsis points), as well as instances where the speaker laughs or his/her voice quality is suggestive of laughter (marked with an explicit comment in diamond brackets).
This is not to say that there are no other providers of English-medium education in the region. Since 2003 there has been an overall rapid expansion of private English-medium schooling, with many such schools having been launched by various, predominantly local, NGOs (Harlech-Jones et al. 2005:561). Yet the Aga Khan Education Services, Pakistan, is ‘by far the largest private provider of education in the Northern Areas’ (Harlech-Jones et al. 2005:557).

In 2010 an American Corner, or ‘information outpost similar to a public library’ was opened, providing ‘access to current and reliable information from and about the United States via book collections, the Internet, and through local programming to the general public overseas or abroad’ (Dushanbe US Embassy, http://dushanbe.usembassy.gov/ac.html). Yet it is worth noting that its location was chosen on the basis of Khorog already being associated with widespread competence in English, connected with AKES institutions (Wikileaks cable (2008). ‘Why American Corners Matter’. Online: http://www.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/08DUSHANBE634_a.html; cf. Bolander forthcoming b).

Since 2001, an exchange program also exists between the Aga Khan Lycée in Khorog and the Aga Khan Academy in Mombasa, with four sixth-grade students from the English stream being sent to Mombasa each year, where they remain for six and a half years (to complete their schooling). Cf. Bolander (forthcoming a) for extensive discussion of this and other programs.

REFERENCES


——— (forthcoming b). English language policy as ideology in multilingual Khorog, Tajikistan.


